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australia’s fiscal straightjacket by fred argy
summary
The Howard Government and Rudd’s Labor opposition have both embraced the notion that in 
general tax rates and public debt levels should not increase. This fiscal strategy is lazy and timid 
policy, not good governance  It is impeding the Government’s capacity to meet the nation’s 
infrastructure needs, forcing it to adopt financing options that are economically less efficient and 
denying Australians a genuine, well informed choice on the appropriate balance between public and 
private goods. The fiscal straightjacket is based on several myths about the impact of taxation and 
government borrowing. 
MYth realitY
1. Higher taxes are bad for 
economic growth
The economic impact of taxes depends on the initial tax level, how the 
revenue is raised, and how productively the money is spent. There is no 
correlation between the size of government and economic performance.
2. A public debt freeze is the 
key to sound public finance
Net public debt is not a true measure of the strength of a government’s 
balance sheet - instead the focus should be on net public worth - assets 
minus liabilities.
3. The private sector is 




The benefits of private design, construction, and operation of 
infrastructure can be captured without private ownership. The private 
sector often demands excessive premiums to take on political risk - and 
when privatised services fail, governments must still step in. Insufficient 
competition can also mean that the costs of monopoly regulation 
outweigh the benefits of private participation. 
4. Shifting from 
government borrowing to 
private equity helps ease 
pressure on inflation and 
interest rates
When productive resources of the economy are fully stretched, any new 
large scale debt-financed investment runs the risk of generating inflation 
but this risk is not reduced by transferring financing responsibilities to 
the private sector. In either case, inflationary pressures can be avoided 
by judicious timing of the investment or by discouraging or deferring 
other types of national spending. Government debt does not affect the 
international cost of credit. 
5. If a particular 
infrastructure project 
cannot be sensibly financed 
by the private sector, 
revenue can fill the gap
It is unfair to ask today’s taxpayers to cover the entire cost of investments 
that will yield returns far into the future. Current revenue should 
primarily be used to pay for current expenses. 
6. There is no evidence that 
the fiscal straightjacket has 
impeded infrastructure 
investment
Public investment is lower today as a proportion of GDP than it 
was 15 years ago, and has been dropping faster in Australia than in 
comparable countries. The greatest decline (in both economic and 
social infrastructure) has been in forms of investment which do not lend 
themselves to private equity funding.
7. Running structural 
fiscal surpluses is good for 
national productivity
By holding back investment in high-return areas such as education, 
health, early childhood, training, transport, etc, our obsession with 
surpluses may actually be holding back Australia’s productivity growth.  
8. The community prefers 
lower taxes and does not 
like the idea of governments 
borrowing
Opinion polls show a clear preference for increased spending on health 
and education over tax cuts. The community is only uneasy about 
government borrowing because they have been told it is financially 
irresponsible by both major parties - effective leadership could put an 
end to this misconception.
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australia’s fiscal straightjacket 
introduction
There is widespread consensus amongst policy makers that while governments need to be 
responsive to short-term cyclical fluctuations, they should set their budget strategy in a 
sustainable medium term framework (i.e. over the business cycle). This is agreed to be good 
for policy predictability, financial market stability and public accountability. 
But this leaves an unanswered question: what is the appropriate medium term fiscal stance? 
The Howard Government has locked itself into a fiscal straightjacket by promising that over 
the business cycle, the following two policy settings will hold:  
tax receipts will not rise relative to gross national product; and 
there will be no net government borrowing (no increase in public debt).
This double barrelled fiscal stance effectively sets a ceiling on tax rates and then insists that 
all government spending, including all capital spending, should be fully paid for out of tax 
revenue. Kevin Rudd has called it “fiscal orthodoxy” and has enthusiastically committed a 
future Labor government to it. 
For the government’s part, Treasurer Peter Costello takes every opportunity to lambast state 
governments for maintaining excessively high tax levels and for recently reversing their 
decade-long anti-borrowing stance (even though the states will be borrowing only to pay for 
new long term infrastructure). Yet the rationale for the Howard Government’s structural 
fiscal stance is questionable. It is based on a series of myths or half-truths. This paper 
examines eight of these myths.
Myth 1: higher taxes are bad for economic growth
While tax policy is often portrayed as an inevitable “race to the bottom” between competing 
nations, few economists accept the generalisation that higher taxes hinder economic growth. 
The economic impact of higher taxes depends on the initial tax level, how the revenue is 
raised and how productively the money is spent.1 Tax increases can have significant incentive 
costs (though even here there is considerable controversy 2) – but these costs can be 
minimized by choosing tax instruments carefully. Indeed, the costs of higher taxes are often 
outweighed by the economic benefits of the spending programs. That’s why it is hard to find a        
significant statistical correlation between size of government - levels of government spending 
and taxation - and economic performance. 
»
»
...it is hard 
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Those who support lower government spending argue that ‘government failure’ is worse than 
‘market failure’, and that there is therefore a need for a ‘disciplined and restrained approach’ 
to public spending. On the other hand, those who want governments to spend more on 
infrastructure, education, health, early childhood intervention and so on, can make excellent 
social arguments for these policies.
The ‘big government’ versus ‘small government’ debate is essentially a difference of opinion 
based on ideology – not economics. Each proposal requiring higher taxation should be 
assessed on its economic and social merit without any presumption for or against.
Myth 2: a public debt freeze is the key to sound public finance
This claim simply doesn’t make sense. Net public debt - the difference between the 
government’s stock of financial (mainly debt) liabilities and its financial assets - is not an 
appropriate way to measure the strength of a government’s balance sheet.      
Instead, the focus should be on net public worth - all financial and non-financial assets 
minus all liabilities. If governments borrow money to invest in productive assets with a 
comparable life to the debt, this adds to net public debt but does not detract at all from net 
worth. Depending on the investment, it may even increase net worth in the long term. 
Prudentially, the only requirement on governments should be to ensure that over the 
medium term, they run a net operating surplus (an excess of current revenue over current 
expenses) and borrow only to invest in projects that have met the standard cost-benefit 
criteria. This should ensure that net government worth is stable or rising and that public debt 
is kept at a serviceable level over the long term. 
This is the stance currently adopted by state governments and by most other OECD 
governments 3. It is only the Federal Treasurer who is out of line. 
Australia’s public debt levels are among the very lowest in the developed world (less than 
one twentieth of the OECD average relative to GDP).  All Australian governments have very 
strong (although lazy) balance sheets4 and our credit rating agencies are generally relaxed 
about an increase in government borrowing for investment purposes.5 This suggests that 
Australia has more - not less - freedom to borrow than other OECD countries.
australia’s 
public debt 
levels are among 
the very lowest 
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Myth 3: the private sector is always a more efficient owner-manager 
of infrastructure than government
This is another axiom of the current economic debate, but there is scant evidence to support it. 
There is little doubt that the private sector is generally better than the public sector in the 
design, construction and operation of infrastructure. But private ownership is not required     
to capture these benefits. Governments can and do outsource most operational matters to            
private operators and consultants, while still retaining ownership of the assets involved.  
The efficiency case for private ownership is based on a number of questionable premises. 
Firstly, it assumes that the equity risks of the infrastructure project are largely commercial 
in character. In fact, the equity risks are often more regulatory and political in character. In 
such cases, the private sector is likely to demand an excessive risk premium, as the users of 
many of Australia’s toll-roads and tunnels have found.
Secondly, the government is not always able to effectively transfer to the private sector the 
ultimate risk of default. Whatever the formal contracts might say, if a privatized hospital, 
school, road or railway network fails to perform, voters still hold the government responsible, 
often leading to costly bailouts of the new private owners. 
Thirdly, private ownership is able to deliver benefits to users only if there is sufficient 
competition both in financial and service markets. The market for infrastructure finance has 
now matured and is fully competitive; up-front transaction costs such as fees to financial 
intermediaries are now more reasonable than they were. But it remains hard to avoid quasi-
monopoly market power in many infrastructure service markets. In these circumstances, 
privatisation requires close regulation and monitoring to ensure accountability, transparency 
and reasonable prices. The cost of enforcing and complying with watchful regulation can 
remove many of the efficiency advantages of private participation in such cases. 
Nor is it certain that private ownership will lead to improved managerial incentives. 
Government agencies are often derided for their lack of modern management expertise, 
but in recent years they have developed ways to auction out community service obligations 
which avoid opportunistic political interference while also giving managers clear goals and 
well-structured performance incentives. Private ownership comes with its own management 
problems - the management decisions of listed companies for example are frequently 
distorted to satisfy the short-term demands of the financial markets. 
Finally, an insistence on private equity financing can lead to the misallocation of resources. 
For example, it tends to create a bias in favour of infrastructure investments with commercial 
potential and against social infrastructure, an issue addressed later in this paper. In the 
case of new roads, privatisation can distort patterns of usage, for example by encouraging 
motorists to take less time-efficient routes.
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In view of these limitations, it is not surprising that a recent OECD study of country 
experiences 6 finds there are only “limited” efficiency gains from reliance on the private sector 
for the ownership and provision of social protection.
Private equity financing will often be able to save taxpayers money and offer a service which 
is cheaper and more responsive to consumer preferences. But governments should not start 
with a presumption that it is always superior to public ownership, which is what the embargo 
on net public borrowing implies. Each case needs to be assessed on its own merits.
Myth 4: shifting from government borrowing to private equity helps 
ease pressure on inflation and interest rates
This view about the impact of government debt on interest rates and inflation is widely held 
- even by people who should know better 7. Yet it has little validity. 
The ultimate constraint on new government investment is the productive capacity of the 
economy. If the productive resources of the economy are fully stretched at the start, new 
investment does run the risk of generating inflation and pushing up interest rates. However, 
transferring ownership responsibilities for new infrastructure to the private sector does 
not remove this constraint. The pressures on demand, inflation and interest rates are the 
same whether new infrastructure is financed by public or private debt. In either case, what 
is needed is good cyclical demand management (such as deferring investment or reducing 
national spending in other areas). 
But are global financial markets more likely to react negatively if a major new program of 
infrastructure investment is financed by public sector borrowing rather than by private 
interests? In other words, will markets punish governments with an extra interest rate 
“loading” for country and sovereign risk?
In the past, credit rating agencies have shown some unease about government debt-financed 
investment, because of the lack of commercial and market disciplines in decision-making 
and the danger that it might create useless ‘white elephants’. But with Australia’s public debt 
levels now at historically low levels, and provided that new infrastructure decisions are made 
on the basis of sound cost-benefit evaluations, rating agencies and financial markets can be 
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Myth 5: if a particular infrastructure project cannot sensibly be 
financed by the private sector, revenue can fill the gap   
Relying on current revenue to pay for the full cost of new social investment is not a viable 
alternative to government borrowing. 
Firstly, it is unfair to ask today’s Australians to pay upfront for new capital spending that will 
yield returns over a period of several years or even decades. Revenue should only be used to 
pay for annual accrual expenses such as interest, depreciation, operational and maintenance 
costs.
Secondly, the use of tax revenue when the borrowing alternative is preferable has an 
economic efficiency cost in the short term.  It may squeeze out desirable recurrent outlays, 
and if it leads to higher tax levels it could discourage work at the margin and force people 
into less preferred choices.9 
Thirdly, as the capacity of federal governments to fund the up-front capital costs of 
infrastructure out of current revenue is limited by the self-imposed ceiling on tax levels 
relative to GDP, reliance on revenue in lieu of borrowing creates a bias against social 
infrastructure (relative to private commercial investments or self-funding economic 
infrastructure) in the same way as over-reliance on private financing. 
Myth 6: there is no evidence that the fiscal straightjacket has 
impeded infrastructure investment
One of the key concerns raised by critics of the present fiscal straightjacket is that it has led to 
neglect of Australia’s public infrastructure – especially social infrastructure. 
Evidence for this neglect can be found in three main sources: macro outcomes, micro 
surveys/studies and public opinion.
First, the macroeconomic data. Public investment is lower today as a proportion of GDP than 
it was fifteen years ago. In the late 1960s, public investment was equal to one-half of private 
investment. Today, it is barely one-fifth.  
This is a significant decline, but by itself it does not prove fiscal neglect. Other factors, such 
as an increase in cost-based pricing (which affects demand), may be involved. Or the drop 
may reflect past over-investment in some areas and a shift from public to private financing. 
But the decline in public investment has been more rapid in Australia than in many other 
comparable countries.10 And it turns out that the most marked decline has been in areas of 
...reliance on 
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social investment which do not lend themselves easily to private equity funding. We will 
return to this issue in greater depth below.
Second, turning from aggregate statistics to sector-specific surveys and studies, there is 
plenty of evidence of deficiencies in economic infrastructure in important pockets of the 
Australian economy - such as power generation capacity, telecommunications, seaports and 
coal terminals.11 Perhaps more noticeable to the ordinary voter is the slow run-down in social 
infrastructure: public schools, hospitals, urban roads and transport, child care, training, 
lifelong learning institutions, community and preventative health care facilities, rail tracks, 
energy and water supply, age and disability care institutions, and public housing.12 
This is important because there are many credible cost-benefit studies showing that social 
investments yield high marginal social returns (perhaps the best example of which is the 
large body of research demonstrating the value of investing in early childhood development 
programs).
Finally, opinion polling shows a widely held and growing disenchantment with the standard 
of public services, especially in big cities and in regional areas, and a strong willingness to 
pay more taxes to improve the quality of services.13
If we accept that there is a shortfall in public investment, what is to blame?
We know the private sector has been eager to participate in projects with a reasonable 
cash flow, albeit with government guarantees or subsidies at times. So the deficiencies in 
economic infrastructure are more likely to be due to bad planning, poor management, or tax 
disincentives than lack of finance. 
On the other hand, private finance is less suitable for social infrastructure projects because 
such projects are relatively complex, long lived and capital-intensive, with long pay-back 
periods. They seldom generate sufficient reliable revenue to make them even approximately 
self-funding, and due to the need for cross-subsidation of some groups of users on equity 
grounds, they face special challenges when it comes to charging users for their services.
Therefore, if governments set themselves an arbitrary goal of zero or low net borrowing (as 
has been the practice for much of the last decade), and if alternative methods of financing 
social infrastructure are unacceptable or subject to constraints, the effect must be to create 
an artificial bias against such investments. 
As governments have constrained their investment spending over the last decade to fit into 
the fiscal straightjacket, social infrastructure has been the main victim. This has happened            
at the same time as a long-term decline in the share of non-cash benefits going to the poor.14 
It is also significant that the decline in public investment has been most marked in ‘General 
Government’ fixed capital non-defense spending; in other words, education, health, housing, 
transport and community amenities. Spending by government trading enterprises – which is 
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True, some of the gaps in social infrastructure supply can be corrected by other means than 
new investment. For example, in transport the misallocation of public capital is a problem   
– we spend too much on roads and not enough on public transport. There is also a need for 
pricing reforms in some areas (congestion taxes in our cities might be a good place to start). 
However, the most important factor contributing to our infrastructure deficiencies has been 
the embargo on new government borrowing. 
Myth 7: running structural fiscal surpluses is good for national 
productivity
The argument that fiscal surpluses boost productivity can be turned on its head. Could it be 
that our long series of surpluses has actually harmed national productivity?
As already discussed, the embargo on government borrowing tends to have efficiency costs, 
ramping up the tax burden in the early years of an investment and encouraging governments 
to use private financing when it is not the optimal choice. 
More fundamentally, the present fiscal stance artificially constrains the ability of 
governments to choose between social and economic infrastructure and between private 
goods and collective services, even when the latter offers relatively high marginal social 
returns. In particular, it creates a bias in the allocation of capital which acts against many 
types of social investment: public schools, hospitals, urban roads and transport, child care 
development, training, lifelong learning institutions and community and preventative 
health care facilities. Capital markets work very imperfectly. They have a tendency to ignore 
wider economic benefits for ‘third parties’ not directly involved in market transactions, 
such as effects on the environment, travel time, accidents, and the productivity of the 
unpaid household sector. Further, they tend to under-invest in merit goods such as health, 
education, job search, specific training and certain kinds of infrastructure. 
While government failure is also rife, and needs to be taken into account, it is ideological 
bigotry to assume that governments are always incapable of correcting for market failures. A 
number of credible studies have found national economic returns (in terms of real incomes 
per head) of between $2 and $10 per dollar of government outlays on early childhood 
disadvantage and broader access to health, education, housing, public transport and 
improved urban freeways.15 
The gains come in myriad forms: a better educated and skilled workforce; greater geographic 
and occupational mobility of labour, less waste of potentially successful entrepreneurs, 
higher employment participation rates, diminished health costs, lower imprisonment 
rates, less spending on welfare and juvenile delinquency, savings in commuting time, lower 
accidents and reduced pollution. Our creaking social infrastructure may now be holding back         
Australia’s productivity growth.
could it be that 
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International studies show that governments (notably the Nordic democracies, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Austria) that choose to give relatively high priority to social investment 
have been very successful in reconciling high levels of social redistribution with good or even 
superior economic outcomes.16 
The perception that governments are trying to achieve genuine equality of opportunity 
through social investment can reduce the risk of community backlash against further 
efficiency-driven economic reform.
Myth 8: the community prefers lower taxes and does not like the idea 
of governments borrowing
When Australians are simply asked if they want lower taxes, the majority unsurprisingly say 
yes. But when they are asked to express a preference for lower taxes relative to additional 
spending on such things as health, education and the environment, the responses are much 
more in favour of spending.17
It is true that the electorate is uneasy with large-scale government borrowing. But the most 
likely reason for this is that voters have been told that it is financially irresponsible by both 
major parties for so long. Australians would probably respond much more positively if they 
were told that government borrowing for investment purposes is prudentially sound, that 
it would improve the quality of public services in concrete ways, and that, if the spending 
is well timed over the cycle, it would have no adverse effect on interest rates. After all, who 
doesn’t want better roads, world-class public hospitals, good schools and less pollution? 
The present fiscal stance poses a basic democratic problem: by setting arbitrary fiscal targets, 
governments are restricting their own ability to respond to the preferences and expectations 
of the community. The result is that as a society, we are being prevented from exercising the 
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cONclusiONs 
Australia has got itself into a fiscal straightjacket – one which arbitrarily presumes that lower 
taxes and lower public debt are always good for the economy and in line with community 
preferences. 
This policy stance doesn’t score well on grounds of economic efficiency, social well-being or 
democratic legitimacy. With Australia’s public debt and tax levels at very low levels – both 
historically and compared with the rest of the world - and with our social and environmental 
infrastructure perceived by most Australians to be in a state of neglect, it would be in the 
national interest to relax the present fiscal straightjacket. 
Instead of attacking the states for their current modest borrowing programs, the federal 
government should be taking the lead on a more coordinated national approach to 
infrastructure development priorities, as well as allocating a bigger share of its windfall 
revenue from the commodity price boom to new infrastructure. And, while giving due 
consideration to private-public partnerships, it should not rule out government net 
borrowing or tax increases over the economic cycle - subject to some basic checks: proper 
cost-benefit evaluation processes, sensible timing of spending over the business cycle, 
reasonable limits on the rate of increase in public debt levels, and a commitment to maintain 
or increase public sector “net worth” in the medium term on an accruals accounting basis.
This alternative fiscal strategy has no chance of acceptance in the present heated election 
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endnotes
1 See Argy (2006), pp57-60 and Argy (2o07-2), as listed in References.
2  Keating points to literature which finds that “there is not much empirical evidence of 
taxation affecting the supply of labour or saving”, see Keating (2004), p29, in References.
3  The UK, for example, seeks only to keep the operational account in the black and borrows 
if it needs to invest in excess of its annual savings. The EU countries are bound not to exceed a cash 
deficit of three per cent of GDP over the cycle.
4  NSW, like most other states, has a high and rising net public worth.
5  See, for example, comment by Standard and Poor that the AAA rating of NSW is not under 
threat “because of its strong balance sheet” (Alan Wood, The Australian, 24 February 2006). Hugh 
Emy in Australian Fabian News, June 2005, observes that “it is clear from comments by Standard 
and Poor that investment aimed at expanding long-run economic capacity is more likely to support 
than diminish credit ratings in the long run”. 
6  “Should we extend the role of private social expenditure?” OECD Social, Employment and 
Migration Working Paper no. 23, 2005.
7  Mr Costello blasted the states for “running deficits” (borrowing) because it would put 
upward pressure on interest rates - but in the same interview he said that he had “no problem with 
bank financed private debt” (Marc Moncrief, The Age, 8 June 2006). 
8  Two papers by Treasury officers lend strong credence to the view that financial markets are 
more relaxed about an increase in government and external debt when public debt levels are low. See 
Gruen and Sayegh (2005) and Comley et al (2001), in References. 
9  See Argy (2007), p149, in References. 
10 Kamps (2006) shows that the government net capital stock as a percentage of GDP at 1995 
prices was 19th lowest out of 22 countries in 2000 compared with a ranking of 11 in 1980. See also 
Hugh Emy in Australian Fabian News, June 2005. If one assumes a stable relationship between 
the desired stock of capital and level of GDP, then in a period of accelerating economic growth, like 
the present, the ratio of infrastructure investment to GDP should be rising in Australia. It is only in 
the most recent year that public investment has taken off, driven by state government infrastructure 
spending. 
11 For example, in transport, much has been said of the problems of the Pacific Highway and 
the lack of an inland north-south rail freight link or corridor. Also there are concerns about coal 
supply bottlenecks such as Dalrymple Bay terminal in Queensland (Adele Ferguson, The Australian 
18 July 2007).
12 See Argy (2006), chapter 4.
13 25 per cent of Australians don’t have faith they would receive adequate hospital treatment if 
they had an accident, according to a recent Roy Morgan Research survey. See also Argy (2006) p47, 
55.
14 See ABS’ Government Benefits, Taxes and Household Income, Australia, 2003-04 (ABS 
6537.0); Victorian Government study Shared Future (2004); and Ann Harding in The Australian, 25 
February 2002.
15 See ABS’ Australian System of National Accounts, 2005-06 (ABS 5204.0). 
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16  See Argy (2006-2), pp64-65. See also Abelson et al (2003) and Fitzgerald (2003). The 
Business Council of Australia commissioned a study in 2005 which estimated a $16b permanent 
increase in GDP from $90b spent on infrastructure – mostly economic rather than social. Research 
modeling by The Brotherhood of St Laurence indicates that every dollar of investment in community 
enterprises that tackle local, long term unemployment could yield societal benefits of $14 (Tony 
Nicholson, Australian Policy Online, 12 September 2007). 
17  See Argy (2006-2), pp66-7 and 75ff.
18  See sources in Argy (2006), p58.
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